Chisholm

Evil, as noted by religious individuals and atheists alike, is a term used to describe unthinkable suffering and inconceivable disillusionment experienced by any living being. This term, as used in such harsh connotations is deemed rather irrational when related to either the goodness and/or sincerity of an omnipotent God. There are many factors that induce many different opinions and inferences as to the existence of God as a result of such suffering. But, does the existence of evil truly place the existence of an omnipotent being that is subsequently also responsible for our happiness under scrutiny? Freewill, natural evil and religious conditioning in relation to human rationality all play integral roles in creating an argument, whereby on the grounds of evil, by the definition given earlier, a good and loving God would fail to exist or consequently consecrate His existence.

The first and subsequently more controversial facet of the argument in disproving the existence of God as a good and loving being, by introducing the concept of evil, is Ð''freewill'. Freewill, of its own accord and definition, is a term used to describe a being's ability to derive of decisions made free of any external force or superior being, whether that being be God or otherwise. If it were to be understood that freewill, in context of the above mentioned definition, was bestowed on us by God as an omnipotent being, it would seem as rationality suggests, that God himself would be contradicting the traditional meaning of the word. In allowing beings to posses the ability to choose

2

regardless of external interference, God remains independent of freewill and is therefore not able to interfere with personal choice, regardless of His omnipotence. This is then

subsequently an inference that God, even in his omnipotence has nothing to do with the decisions made by being's, whether these decisions be either good, in the traditional sense of the word, or evil, as explained earlier. Thus, decisions made by being's, that are regarded as evil, are not as a result of an evil God, but rather a personal choice of freewill by beings as such could consequently result in the suffering of another. God then remains independent of that choice and as such remains independent of the evil that was created. Freewill alone is then, in relation to what has been said, not enough to substantiate an argument whereby God's goodness is challenged. God, by pure definition as derived from freewill, remains good, as the decisions made are independent of his goodness and can therefore not be related to the concept of God as being evil or good. His omnipotence and goodness in this matter cannot be challenged, purely by conceding to contradiction in relation to freewill. However, the question then subsequently arises as to why God did indeed choose to have freewill as part of his creation, for in doing so he subsequently allows evil to enter as well. And then, almost immediately, the argument is directed towards the lack of interference of an infinitely good God who, in his omnipotence, could very well have eradicated evil regardless of freewill and as such could have saved the unconceivable suffering endured by beings. B.C Johnson in his argument "God and the problem of evil" (Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, Reason and Responsibility, Pg 85),

3

adequately rebuts this initial response by elaborating that freewill is integral to any being as it is this very attribute that allows beings to make the right choices (choices that invariably prove to be good as apposed to evil), thus, in honesty a human could, of their own accord, eradicate evil from within themselves and in so doing create and even purer being that God could not create without freewill. Evidently, this statement could be seen differently, as with freewill evil could also manifest in an even more aggressive way than without it. So as to the question of an evil God in relation to a good God and the rationality of believing in an infinitely good God, it is hard to make such a claim with such a temperamental variable as freewill. Freewill in itself is then completely independent of God and therefore God has very little to do with personal evil and then subsequently personal choice. So, as with any variable, Ð''freewill' as an excuse for an either good God or equally evil God can be paralleled either way. This then, proves that the "existence of a good God could be used in reverse to make the same world consistent with an evil God." (Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, Pg 85). This then, by inducing a parallel effect, substantiates the concept of rational belief in an omnipotent God that is all-good and thus the introduction of evil upon freewill cannot hinder the concept of a good God or the creation of freewill as to whether it is be considered evil or good.

Natural evil seems to be one of the most, if not the most controversial aspect in the argument of evil in relation to the existence of God. Religion is harshly questioned due to

4

the ongoing suffering endured by humans as a cause of natural evil, this then subsequently relates directly to God and the role He plays in creating such evil. How then is it possible for an all-good and powerful God not to interfere in the unnecessary suffering of humans under conditions which they can neither control nor predict? Richard Swinburne, in his argument "Why God allows evil" (Feinberg- Shafer Landau, Reason and Responsibility, Pg 95) suggest that there are two reasons as to why an omnipotent being such a God would in effect allow evil to enter into existence. The first suggestion is that natural evil enables humans to judge, via disaster, which choices to make, and this then subsequently relates to the concept of freewill and the ensuing consequences of such choice. Morally speaking a good choice would enrich a being and therefore natural disaster enables the creation of good beings independently of God. A being of purer existence via personal choice would be created, a being that God could not create via His own decisions. The second suggestion is that "natural processes alone give humans knowledge of the effects of their actions without inhibiting their freedom, and if evil

...