Organizational Behaviour - the Homeless

The Homeless

Organization identity was defined as member’s beliefs about the organizations enduring, distinctive, and central characteristics. Thus, the organizations identity strongly influenced how members interpreted the homeless problem. Interpretations of the homelessness problem led to individual actions that reshaped the organizations image and subsequently led to different interpretations and actions. This study illustrates that organizations adapt to change through a process that entails reciprocal relationships between the context and organization members over time. Dutton & Dukerich examined a noteworthy relevant change of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The logical change included the developing quantities of vagrants utilizing the Port Authority's transport terminal and hence different offices, for example, the airplane terminals and World Trade Center. Association personality was characterized as individuals' convictions about the association's persisting, unmistakable, and focal qualities. Picture was characterized as how individuals thought individuals outside the association saw the association. A mind boggling interaction in the middle of connection and people happened as the Port Authority adjusted to the developing quantities of vagrants. The example of activity on issues can along these lines strengthen or, conceivably, change the association's character and picture through people's sense endeavouring endeavours, and the procedure of adjustment proceeds. Translations of the vagrancy issue prompted individual activities that reshaped the association's picture and hence prompted distinctive elucidations and activities. This study outlines that associations adjust to change through a procedure that involves complementary connections between the setting and association individuals after some time.

Air Disaster

Weick’s analysis emphasized the interplay of contextual features, which created stress for cockpit and air traffic control crews by interrupting their routines. Weick argued that a stressful setting caused various crews to fall back on their most familiar and well rehearsed response routines. He draws on Hage to argue that most relationships at the individual level of analysis, including those between stress and performance, are curvilinear; but as the level of analysis becomes more macro, relationships become more linear. Conversely, the occasions encompassing the Tenerife air debacle that Weick examined occurred in a matter of minutes. Weick's examination accentuated the exchange of relevant elements, which made anxiety for cockpit and air activity control groups by interfering with their schedules. Weick connected Mandler's hypothesis of anxiety to contend that relevant occasions interfered with routine working methods, creating large amounts of excitement. Subsequently, the flight and air movement control teams made the wrong reactions, prompting the fatal accident. An intriguing part of Weick's investigation is the qualification he draws in the middle of individual and gathering reactions. He attracts on Hage to contend that most connections at the individual level of examination, including those in the middle of anxiety and execution, are curvilinear; however as the level of investigation turns out to be more large scale, connections turn out to be straighter. Thus, a well working, profoundly coordinated cockpit group may have reacted to the expanded anxiety with expanded execution.

Nuclear Power Plant

Ross and B. M. Staw examined the decision to build and operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant by top management of the Long Island Lighting Company. Ross and Staw propose that commitment to this losing course of action was initially launched by psychological factors operating on top management, including excessive optimism and social comparisons to other power company executives who had been able to build and operate such plants successfully.

The numerous planners, operators, technical support staff, and other employees hired to build and operate the plant became a powerful internal constituency, who pressured top management to maintain commitment to the project. J. Ross and B. M. Staw analyzed the choice to construct and work the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant by top administration of the Long Island Lighting Company. They archive how the interchange between top administration's activities and the hierarchical and political connection made by these activities drove the organization to spend more than 5 billion dollars on a plant at first evaluated to cost 75 million. The various organizers, administrators, specialized bolster staff, and different representatives employed to assemble and work the plant turned into a capable inner supporters, who constrained top administration to keep up duty to the task. Ross and Staw note that once these gatherings were composed and legitimated, they turned out to be not a benefit but rather a requirement on top chiefs' choice making, compelling them to go ahead with the venture even subsequent to proceeding with money related misfortunes debilitated the organization. This contextual investigation shows how top administrators' starting activities may make a hierarchical and political setting that therefore compels their conduct.