�Asses The United Kingdom’S Reasons For Supporting The United States Over The Invasion Of Iraq In 2003’

�Asses the United Kingdom’s reasons for supporting the United States over the invasion of Iraq in 2003’

Since 2003 both the United Kingdom and the United states have come under scrutiny due to their controversial decision to go to war with Iraq. Under the circumstances there are strong political and moral arguments to support this decision. Human rights violations, a dictatorial regime and a brutal military presence headed by Saddam Hussein as well as the fear of WMD provides a strong case for war. However, without support from the United Nations and with the legitimacy of evidence seemingly dubious, it is necessary to define what sets Iraq apart from other rogue states and provides the British government with a reason to break the sovereignty of a nation.

The previous decade had been a time of growing tension between the West and Iraq. Since the end of the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Hussein had continued to rule Iraq with an iron fist. UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 ceased hostilities toward Iraq under a number of conditions including the limitation of Iraqi military development and the resolution of border issues with Kuwait. Between 1991 and 2002 the UN found Iraq to be in breach of these conditions and sanctions were placed upon international trade. A major issue during this time was the belief that Iraq was not only refusing to adhere to military limitations but was actively seeking WMD and biological and chemical weapons. (Bluth, 2004, p.872)

In the build up to 2003 there are a number of international events that are necessary to consider when attempting to understand the decision made by the UK. Global terrorism, particularly since 9/11, was at the forefront of public thought. This would prove to be a primary, if ineffective tool in the attempt to gain public backing for the war. Following these attacks, almost immediately suggestions of a link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein began to surface (Alterman, 2004, p.301). These rumours had no basis in reality and still today seem quite ridiculous. In truth the Iraqi regime was diametrically opposed to Muslim extremism and any belief in a relationship between Saddam and Bin Laden requires a giant leap of faith. It is worth remembering at this point that, soon after 9/11 secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld suggested the US must prepare for war in Iraq, despite there being no evidence of a link. Incidentally three years earlier, in a letter to Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, on the subject of Iraq and WMD Rumsfeld wrote -

A significant portion of the worlds oil will be put at risk. The only

acceptable strategy is ... to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy. (Jhaveri, 2004, p.2)

This prediction some five years earlier gives us an insight into the US reasoning for war. Add to this the sharp rise in oil prices as a result of Venezuelan nationalisation of the industry in 2003 and the decision to export vast quantities to China in preference to the U.S (Ellner, 2007, para.6), and suddenly the West has a potential energy crisis looming.

In the previous years President George W. Bush and Prime minister Tony Blair had formed a relationship that continued a historic trend. The UK, Blair in particular, had become a stepping stone between Europe and the US (Shawcross, 2003, p.46-47). This was quite unspectacular, however, the Bush/Blair bond seemed to be closer than that of previous transatlantic ties. Values and morals played a key role in the forming of this special relationship and the US neo-conservative administration was, in terms of foreign policy mimicked by the Labour government.

In so far as foreign pre-emptive intervention is concerned, Blair was proud of his previous success and cited both the case of Sierra Leone and the Taleban in speeches referring to Iraq. He was confident by this time that when military action was necessary it was the role of western democracies to step in. On April 7, 2002 discussing WMD and Iraq Blair stated (Bluth, 2004, p.875)�If necessary the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change’

To his credit Blair, seeing an opportunity to flaunt his self styled diplomatic brio, was able to persuade Bush to initially act through the UN before going to war and rallied around Europe for support. UNSCR 1441 demanded that Iraq disarm in full compliance with previous Security Council resolutions or face �serious consequences’. When these demands were not met the US/UK decision was made to invade Iraq without any additional resolution. (Bluth, 2004, p.879)

The official reasons given to the British public were based upon intelligence that suggested an international threat from the Iraqi regime. The infamous dossier of February 2003 was the foundation of the public campaign for support. The document outlined the military capabilities of Iraq and suggested a serious threat using statistics and time scales to determine exactly how real this threat was. In hindsight the sources and information in the �Dodgy dossier’ have become widely regarded as unreliable and much of it rhetoric over fact. What the original Joint Intelligence Commitee Dossier stated was -

Recent intelligence casts light on Iraq’s holdings of weapons of mass destruction and on its doctrine for using them.Intelligence remains limited and Saddam’s own unpredictability complicated judgements about Iraqi use of these [chemical and biological] weapons.

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