Aquinas’ Summa Theologica

1,        In a single sentence, what is Aquinas’ main conclusion?

After reading  first part of Aquinas’ “Summa Theologica”, in which he had given five proofs as disproof to the theory about non-existence of a God, In my opinion, he thought that there is someone who moves and directs others, is majestic and cause to others existence.  He understood this force as a God.           

2,        Is there anything strange about the way this passage begins, given what his conclusion is? Why do you think Aquinas starts his discussion the way that he does?

In my point of view, it is not strange. Opposite it, this form is more clearly to readers. Aquinas had written this with logic concept. Author started from dividing this doctrine into three parts where considered questions separately about existence of a God and an evidence that proves. Also at the beginning Aquinas wrote thoughts and ideas of the other philosophers about this theme, after he answered them with his strong arguments.

3,           Focusing on the second of the “Five Ways,” how would you summarize Aquinas’ argument? (Try to number each proposition, and see if you can get it down to just 2 to 4 simple propositions.) 

По словам автора, ничто не может существоват до себя и следовательно не может быть причиной для себя. Должна быть высшая причина , у которой последствии берут начало и продолжают быть причиной для других. Но так не может продолжаться бескончено, потому что тогда не будет и первой и средней и последней причины, а если не будет первой причины, тогда не будут ничего. Поэтому должна быть высшая причина и под нее имеется ввиду Бог.

According to the author, in the universe all things exist due to cause and nothing can exist before itself, therefore it can not be a reason for itself.  First efficient cause must be which have consequences and continue to be cause for others. But this can not continue infinitely, because then there will be no first cause, no intermediate and no last effect. After if there is no some first cause among others, then there won’t be any consequences. So there must be the first efficient cause and Thomas called it a God.

P1)        Among sensible things there is an ordering of efficient causes

P2)        It is impossible to be prior to itself

C1)        Therefore among sensible things nothing were not be efficient cause of itself

P3)        If efficient causes go to infinity, there would not be a first efficient cause

P4)        If there is no first efficient cause, there would not be a last effect or any intermediate cause

P5)        It is False

C2)        Therefore must be some first efficient cause – which everyone calls a God

The second way is based on the notion of an efficient cause:

We find that among sensible things there is an ordering of efficient causes, and yet we do not

find—nor is it possible to find—anything that is an efficient cause of its own self. For if something were

an efficient cause of itself, then it would be prior to itself—which is impossible.

But it is impossible to go on to infinity among efficient causes. For in every case of ordered

efficient causes, the first is a cause of the intermediate and the intermediate is a cause of the last—and

this regardless of whether the intermediate is constituted by many causes or by just one. But when a

cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there were no first among the efficient causes, then

neither would there be a last or an intermediate. But if the efficient causes went on to infinity, there

would not be a first efficient cause, and so there would not be a last effect or any intermediate efficient

causes, either—which is obviously false. Therefore, one must posit some first efficient cause—which

everyone calls a God.

Второй путь исходит из смыслового содержания действующей причины (Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis).

P1)   В чувственно воспринимаемых вещах мы обнаруживаем порядок действующих причин, но мы не находим того (да это и невозможно), чтобы нечто было действующей причиной в отношении самого себя,

P2) Но невозможно и то, чтобы [порядок] действующих причин уход в бесконечность. 

P3) Поскольку во всех упорядоченных [друг относительно друга] действующих причинах первое есть причина среднего, а среднее - причина последнего (неважно, одно это среднее или их много). Но при устранении причины, устраняется и её следствие.

/////C1) поскольку в этом случае оно предшествовало бы себе, что невозможно.

C2) Следовательно, если в [порядке] действующих причин не будет первого, не будет последнего и среднего.

P4) Но если [порядок] действующих причин уходит в бесконечность, то не будет первой действующей причины, а потому не будет и последнего следствия и средней действующей причины, что очевидным образом ложно.

C3) Следовательно, необходимо допускать некую первую действующую причину, которую все называют Богом (Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant).

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